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Institutions of autonomy3 in ethnically heterogeneous states have been conceived as a compromise 
between a desire to safeguard state unity and to partially accommodate the grievances of ethno-
linguistic minorities. However, in practice, the institutions of autonomy often turn into a nucleus of 
a proto state of the ethno-linguistic minority. Instead of resolving the minority issue and stabilising 
the central state, they strengthen the local nationalism and secessionism, acting as centrifugal 
forces, or “subversive institutions”. Recently these processes have been noticed in several ethnically 
heterogeneous, developed Western democracies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether, 
and how, the institutions of autonomy influence the rise of peripheral nationalism and secessionism.
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1 This article has been developed from a PhD thesis defended at the University of Zagreb in 2016 under the title “Politics 
of National Identity. Cases of Spanish and French Basque Country“.
2	 The	opinions	expressed	in	this	article	are	the	author’s	own	and	do	not	reflect	the	views	of	the	author’s	employer,	The	
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Valerie Bunce and “subversive institutions“
In	the	last	couple	of	years,	the	rise	of	secessionism	in	several	democratic	
Western	European	countries	–	 from	the	United	Kingdom	(Scotland)	and	
Belgium	 (Flanders)	 to	 Spain	 (Catalonia	and	 the	Basque	Country)	 –	 has	
been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having 
a	heterogeneous	ethnic	structure,	that	is,	the	existence	of	distinct	historical	
ethnic	communities,	 all	 of	 these	 states	also	 have,	 in	 the	 last	 couple	of	
decades,	gone	through	dramatic	administrative	and	structural	changes.	
From	the	unitary	 states	 they	had	once	been,	 they	have	 transformed	 in	
a way that has resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree 
of	 devolution	 or	 even	 in	 federalization.	 Consequently,	 historical	 ethnic	
communities	 achieved	 a	 certain	 degree	 and	 institutions	 of	 autonomy,	
ranging	 from	a	partial	and	asymmetric	decentralization	 (“devolution”),	
as	 in	 the	case	of	Scotland,	 to	 the	extensive	autonomy	of	 the	so-called	
autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and 
the	legislator	was,	among	other	political	reasons,	to	safeguard	state	unity	
and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic 
communities and their elites.
The	final	outcome,	however,	has	often	been	adverse	to	the	initial	intentions.	
In	the	newly	formed	administrative	units,	the	“proto-states”	of	the	ethnic	






Country,	where	 stronger	 peripheral	 nationalism	 and	 secessionism	 have	
been	noted	in	its	Spanish	part,	whereas	they	are	almost	non-existent	in	its	




which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations of 
the	Soviet	Union	 (USSR),	Czechoslovakia	 (CSFR),	and	Yugoslavia	 (SRFY).	
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Her	 theory	 has	 been	 applied	 on	 Spain	 and	 its	 quasi-federal	 structure	
of	 so-called	 autonomous	 communities	 (comunidades autónomas),	
or	 in	 Spanish	 jargon,	Autonomías. Spanish autonomías,	 being	 in	a	way	
and	maybe	 to	a	 lesser	extent	 similar	 to	 the	 former	 republics	of	 the	ex-
socialist	 federations,	 provide	 a	 kind	 of	 framework	 of	 a	 proto-state,	 a	
nation-state,	a	 “state-in-waiting“,	and	 strengthen	 the	centrifugal	 forces	
and	local	nationalism.	Spanish	Basque	Country,	Autonomous Community 
País Vasco-Euskadi,	 enjoys	many	 prerogatives	 and	 symbols	 of	 a	 state.	
For	example,	 its	 language	enjoys	 the	 status	of	 the	official	 language	of	
the	 local	administration,	 together	with	 (Castilian)	Spanish.	 It	has	 its	own	
administration,	 which	 develops	 even	 its	 own	 paradiplomacy	 (Lecours	
2005)	 and	 its	 own	 police	 force,	 the	 Ertzaintza.	 It	 has	 a	 comprehensive	
network	 of	 educational	 and	 cultural	 institutions	 which	 cherish	 and	
foster	 the	 Basque	 language,	 culture,	 and	 national	 spirit.	 It	 possesses	
a	wide	 range	of	 local	 social	 and	economic	 institutions.	 Finally,	 its	 own	
Parliament	develops	a	regional	(“autonomous“)	party	system	and	fosters	
party competition – including in local patriotism and nationalism. All this 
influences	the	development	of	identity,	not	only	cultural,	but	also	political,	
and strengthens the local nationalism and secessionism.
Valerie	Bunce,	explaining	the	collapse	of	former	communist	federations	of	
the	USSR,	CSFR,	and	SFRY,	subscribes	to	the	thesis	that	“the	very	structure	of	
the bloc and the federation put into place the necessary conditions for the 
rise	of	nations	and	nationalist	movements	in	the	peripheral	units“	(Bunce	1999:	
39),	and	their	design	created	the	preconditions	for	creating	states	within	the	




by	 expanding	 education,	 by	 building	 a	 nationally	 defined	
intelligentsia,	by	developing	at	the	republican	level	a	stable	core	
of	 economic,	 representational,	 coercive,	 social,	 and	 cultural	
institutions,	 each	 of	 which	 was	 led	 by	 powerful,	 durable,	 and	
“nativized“	elite	cadres:	by	providing	considerable	economic	and	
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Therefore,	 Bunce	 holds	 that	 the	 federalism	 created	 nations	 at	 the	
republican	 level	 or,	 if	 they	 had	already	 been	 “defined“,	 strengthened	
them. “Institutions and policies of federal socialist states were important in 
developing individual national identity... collective identity we associate 
with	 the	 ‘nation’“	 (ibid:	 48).	 Federalism	 created	 “states-in-the-making,	
complete	with	their	own	borders,	elites,	national	communities,	and	a	full	
array	of	economic,	political,	social,	and	cultural	institutions“	(ibid:	84–85).	
“Regional party elites fought for their survival by distancing themselves 
and their republics from the centre through...combinations of nationalism“ 
(ibid:	87).	 In	other	words,	the	federal	structures	where	the	autonomous/
federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy in the long term acted 
centrifugally,	which	finally	led	to	the	collapse	of	the	states	(federations).	
With	 the	 advent	 of	 Gorbatchev	 and	 perestroika,	 the	 consequent	
abandoning	 of	 the	 Brezhnev	 doctrine,	 and	 the	 array	 of	 events	 that	








the differences between the French and Spanish Basque Country will be 
observed,	bearing	 in	mind	the	relatively	strong	Basque	nationalism	and	
some	forms	of	 secessionism	 in	 the	Spanish	Basque	Country,	while	 in	 the	
French Basque Country their absence has been noticed.4
The	 other	 authors	 who	 have	 tackled	 or	 further	 elaborated	 the	 theory	
of subversive institutions will also be mentioned in the paper and their 
ideas grouped into three main arguments. The theory will be exposed to 
criticism and a short case study will be added in order to apply the theory 
and	test	the	hypothesis	on	concrete	examples.	Finally,	a	short	summary	of	
the main ideas brought forth in the paper will be given.
4	 The	most	similar	systems	design	holds	that	the	two	cases	share	many	common	features,	and	differ	 in	only	one.	For	
instance,	French	and	Spanish	Basque	Country	are	situated	in	the	same	region,	share	common	language	and	ethnic	
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The theory of subversive institutions in literature
The idea behind	 ethno-federalism,	 that	 is,	 a	 federal	 state	wherein	 the	
federal	 units	 are	 designed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 ethnic	 and	 linguistic	
diversities,	 is	 to	 enable	 minorities	 to	 participate	 in	 power	 and	 to	 give	
them autonomy in order to reduce their inclination towards secession. At 
the	same	time,	the	 intention	 is	 to	diminish	the	risk	of	conflicts	and	other	
extreme	and	unpopular	 solutions,	 like	ethnic	conflicts,	ethnic	cleansing,	
population	 transfers,	 or	genocide	 (Greer	 2007:	 4–7).	 Therefore,	 the	aim	
of	 ethno-federalism	 is	 to	 “accommodate	 territorially	 based	 ethnic,	
cultural	and	 linguistic	differences	 in	divided	societies,	while	maintaining	
the	 territorial	 integrity	 of	 existing	 states”	 (Erk	 and	 Anderson	 2009:	 191).	
The	question	is	whether	such	ethno-federalism	can	be	a	durable	solution	
for	divided	 societies,	 or	 it	 is	 just	a	 step	 towards	 secession.	Autonomous	
institutions are designed to appease the people urging secessionism 
and	 resolve	 the	 societal	 cleavages,	 but	 in	 reality	 they	 freeze	 or	 even	





institutions	 thesis”	 (Roeder	2007;	 2009),	 in	which	he	produces	numerous	
arguments	 against	 ethno-federalism.	 Roeder	 attributes	 to ethno-
federalism	a	number	of	features	that	he	sees	as	weaknesses,	contributing	
to	instability	and	conflict.	Ethno-federal	arrangements	create	“segment-
states”,	 “proto-nation-states”	 for	 the	 ethnic	 groups	 (Roeder	 also	 uses	





term	 effects	 of	 the	 new	 institutional	 arrangement.	 Also,	 “ethno-federal	
and	autonomy	compromises	may	 lead	to	escalation	of	demands”	and	
new	institutions	favour	certain	nation-state	projects	over	others	and	thus	
structure	 “identities,	 capabilities	 and	opportunities”	 (Roeder	 2009:	 208).	
It	 is	not	only	 that	 the	“homeland	 institutions”	are	empowered	and	 that	
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the	central	state	 is	weakened,	but	also	that	the	politicians	are	trapped	
between	the	 two	dangers	–	centralization	on	 the	one	side,	and	 further	
devolution,	which	may	lead	to	dissolution,	on	the	other.	Fighting	against	
one,	they	shift	into	another,	while	the	society	becomes	polarized	in	a	zero-






autonomy resulted in secessionism or the whether the latter impulse had 
existed before and the regions acquired autonomy in an attempt to 
preserve	the	common	state.	Thus,	the	autonomy	did	not	accommodate	
and	mitigate	nationalism,	but	rather	gave	it	a	further	disintegrative	push,	
while in some areas or cases it created it from scratch. 
There	 are	 of	 course	 other	 factors	 that	 make	 autonomous	 institutions	
develop	 a	 “subversive”	 character,	 apart	 from	 the	 institutional	 design	




of	Albania	with	 regards	 to	Kosovo;	Hungary,	 in	 the	case	of	 Slovakia	or	
Romania;	or	Ireland	in	the	case	of	Ulster	(Erk	and	Anderson	2009).	Other	
authors	 see	 the	 danger	 of	 ethno-federalism	 primarily	 in	 cases	 where	




One	can	argue	 that	 the	 institutions	of	autonomy	become	“subversive”	
in	several	ways.	Through	the	institution-building	process,	the	autonomous	
region	 gains	 the	 institutions	 and	 symbols	 of	 a	 proto-state	 by	 which	
it	 strengthens	 and	 nurtures	 local	 nationalism	 and	 secessionism,	 and	
facilitates a potential secession. By means of these institutions and by using 
the	cleavages	of	 “official	 nationalism”	 (Anderson	 1990),5 a subnational 
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latter including party competition.
Argument 1 – Institution building, “state-in-waiting”
Devolution,	that	is,	the	transfer	of	power	from	the	central	to	the	regional	
level,	 empowers	 the	 region	 with	 the	 representative	 institutions	 aspiring	
to	 represent	 their	 region,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 multinational	 state,	 a	
nominal minority nation. Autonomy provides them with “many features of 
state…banners,	 leaders,…schools	and	political	systems”	(Greer	2007:	8).	
Some authors explain the stronger presence of secessionist movements 
in	decentralized	states	 like	Spain	or	 the	United	Kingdom	by	the	 level	of	
transferred	power.	Especially,	as	has	been	demonstrated	by	the	example	
of	Scotland,	where	the	process	of	devolution	stimulated	a	nationalism	and	
secessionism that almost had not existed before. An autonomous region has 
defined	borders	within	which	it	can	hold	a	referendum	on	independence	













state	or	official	nationalism	spreads.	 It	 spreads	by	help	of	 the	state	and	 its	 institutions,	 the	media	under	 its	control,	
through children raised in the patriotic spirit. A nation is built.
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Ezgi	 (2010)	 also	 argues	 that	 the	 institutions	 of	 autonomy	 can	 increase	
secessionism,	 particularly	 where	 the	 causes6 of the grievances of the 
minority population are of a symbolic nature. Not only does the minority 
find	the	autonomy	dissatisfactory,	but	 the	autonomy	also	facilitates	the	
secession,	 providing	 capacity	 for	 it.	 It	 acts,	 therefore,	 as	 a	 “subversive	
institution”.	 Federalism	 acts	 as	 an	 administrative	 capacity	 building	
instrument for a potentially secessionist region. The regional government 
has	an	authority	over	 the	 territory,	which	corresponds	 to	 the	 territory	of	
a	potential	 new	 state	 –	 that	 is,	 it	 has	more	or	 less	 established	borders.	
With	 the	 regional	government,	 the	 local	population	 “learns”	 to	govern	
and	organize	its	own	administration	(for	its	potentially	independent	state).	
A federal state actually offers the “opportunity structure for peripheral 
nationalism“ and a possibility to build up the administrative apparatus of 
a	nucleus,	a	proto-state	of	a	potential	independent	state	(Mansvelt	Beck	
2005:	70,	76,	176).	Consequently,	 in	case	of	secession,	the	new	“nation-
state”	 already	 has	 control	 over	 state	 institutions,	 which	 diminishes	 the	
costs	of	state	building	and	makes	secession	 less	costly,	and,	as	a	result,	
more	attractive	(Ezgi	2010:	7–10).	Therefore	Bunce	(1999)	calls	institutions	
of	 autonomy	 “ready-made	 institutions“	 (for	 secession),	 while	 Erk	 and	
Anderson	(2009)	call	this	phenomenon	the	“paradox	of	federalism“	(197),	
because	federalism	makes	the	dissolution	of	the	state	easier.	
There	 are	 also	 quantitative	 researches	 that	 confirm	 the	 theory	 of	
subversive	 institutions.	 For	 example,	 states	 where	 an	 ethnic	 minority	








cultural	and	political	autonomy,	etc.	 If,	 however,	 the	causes	of	 the	grievances	of	 the	 local	population,	or	ethnic	
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statistically	considerably	more	secessionist	acts,	and	with	the	existing	level	
of	 autonomy	 (such	 as	 administrative,	 executive,	 legislative	 capacities	
and	 two	chamber	parliament),	 each	additional	 element	 of	 autonomy	
increases	 the	 preference	 for	 secession.	 That	 is,	 the	more	 a	 region	 has	
autonomy,	the	higher	the	probability	of	secessionism	(Ezgi	2010:	12–23).7
Argument 2 – Identity building
Decentralization and regional governments create and strengthen 
regional	identities	by	means	of	education,	culture	and	the	media,	which	
are	instruments	of	nation-building	and	a	way	of	spreading	a	national	idea,	
“building	 identification	 with	 the	 political	 community“	 (Martinez-Herrera	
2008:	10).	As	the	competences	in	these	areas	pass	from	the	central	state	
to	regional	institutions,	the	latter	are	now	in	a	position	to	form	a	political	
community different from the state one. Autonomous regions thereby 
acquire	 “instruments	 for	 promoting	 ethnic	 identity“	 (Cornell	 2002:	 17).	
For	instance,	governments	and	parliaments	can	enact	acts	and	laws	on	
special protection of the minority language through education and the 
media,	etc.8 Exactly this process has been followed in the Spanish Basque 
Country,	and	has	been	absent	in	the	French	part	of	Basque	Country.




and	 Croatia	 (Moreno	 2006;	 Tomaić9	 2012).	 The	 newly	 formed	 Spanish	
autonomous	communities,	which	had	no	previous	historical	tradition,	nor	
separate	 language	or	culture,	wishing	 to	endow	 themselves	with	more	
legitimacy,	started	to	construct,	and	even	invent	their	symbols,	flag,	coat	
7	 In	his	article,	Ezgi	(2010)	published	some	interesting	results	of	quantitative	research,	statistical	analysis,	using	the	data	
from the Minorities at Risk	database,	World Development Indicators,	etc.,	from	1339	observations.	His	research	shows	
that	with	99%	significance	level	one	can	conclude	that	in	federal	systems	there	are	statistically	more	secessionist	acts.
8	 For	 instance,	 the	 Spanish	 Basque	Country	 enacted	 LEY básica de normalización del uso del Euskera,	 1982;	 Plan 
General de Promoción del Uso del Euskera,	1999,	etc.
9		 Tomaić	(2012)	shows	how	autonomy	and	regionalism	can	lead	to	the	creation	of	new,	regional	identities,	in	this	case,	
an	Istrian	one,	promoted	by	the	Istrian	Democratic	Assembly	(IDS),	by	which	not	only	they	strengthened	regionalism,	
but indirectly also secessionism.
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of	arms,	 anthem,	 historical	memories,	 founding	 fathers	 or	 father	 of	 the	
“nation“,	even	the	language	specifics,	even	though	they	speak	the	same,	
Castilian	Spanish	language	(Ruggiu	2012).10
Argument 3 – Elite building 






and legitimacy to the decision of the central authorities to decentralize 
the	 state,	 get	an	opportunity	 to	 use	 their	 position	and	power	against	
the same state. They might do it by articulating their voice or mobilizing 
the	masses	against	the	state,	as	leaders	in	a	fight	for	more	autonomy	or	
even	 for	 independence,	or	as	 the	 future	 leaders	of	a	potentially	new	
independent	 state.	 Thus,	 the	 decentralized	 institutions	 of	 autonomy	
for	 future	 leaders	and	elites	 represent	“political	opportunity	structures”	
(Martinez-Herrera	2008;	Meyer	and	Minkoff	2004;	Kitschelt	1986,	Tarrow	
1988).	 Brancati	 (2006:	 6)	 speaks	about	 “contrasting	effects	of	political	
decentralization”.	 With	 respect	 to	 the	 example	 of	 Spanish	 regionalist	
parties,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 decentralization	 has	 had	 the	 impact	 of	
strengthening	 regionalist	parties,	not	only	 in	 those	 regions	which	have	
a	distinct	ethno-linguistic	identity	from	the	Spanish	mainstream,	like	the	
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contributed	 to	an	 increase	 in	 secessionist	 sentiment	 (Erk	and	Anderson	
2009:	199–201).










and lead to stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism. 
The	first	precondition	for	the	secession	of	autonomous	(federal)	units	is	of	
course the existence of a strong distinct identity of the ethnic community. 
Some	authors	mention	 the	 issue	of	 immigration,	which	 induces	a	 sense	
of	 threat	 and	 xenophobia	among	 the	minority	 population,	 and	 fosters	
secessionism as an attempt to respond to the identity loss and to the 
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in	multinational	 states,	where	 the	population	of	 the	 region	 feels,	 up	 to	





Some	 authors	 relate	 the	 “subversiveness”	 of	 institutions	 to	 economic	
development. With respect to the example of the several Russian 
autonomous	 republics	 in	 the	 period	 1987–1992,	 Giuliano	 (2006)	 argues	
that secessionism appeared out of the fear of losing control over the 
economic	resources.	From	the	four	examples	he	had	examined,	Galicia	
and	Catalonia	 in	 Spain,	 Scotland	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom	and	Quebec	
in	Canada,	Martinez-Herrera	 (2008)	noted	 that	only	Galicia,	which	was	
economically	 less	 developed,	 did	 not	 experience	 a	 more	 significant	
rise	 in	 secessionism.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	other	 three	 regions,	which	
were	 relatively	 rich,	experienced	a	growth	 in	 secessionism.	He	explains	
it,	on	the	one	hand,	by	the	differing	interests	of	the	local	economic	elites	
compared	with	the	elites	from	the	political	centre.	Local	elites	help	the	
local	 nationalist	 intelligentsia,	 which	 in	 turn	 mobilizes	 the	 masses	 in	 its	
interest	–	that	is,	in	the	interest	of	the	region.	
Finally,	being	better	off	 in	a	wider	community	 (state)	entails	 state-wide	
solidarity and the transfer of funds from richer to poorer regions. This 
argument,	 in	the	Spanish	case,	 is	valid	more	for	Catalonia,	than	for	the	






but	 receives	according	 to	 its	population”,	which	means	 that	 Euskadi	 is	
“overcontributing	almost	33%”	(sobreaportación)	(Álvarez,	2013).
Also,	 the	 richness	entails	more	 immigration	 from	other	 regions,	which	 in	
turn increases the feeling of there being a threat to the local population 
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of immigration from other Spanish regions. “…Political decentralisation in 
relatively wealthy culturally differentiated regional minorities…seems to 
further	fuel	inclinations	for	separation”	(ibid:	18).	
If	 the	 institutions	 of	 autonomy	 in	 ethno-federal	 states	 indeed	 work	 as	
“subversive	 institutions”,	 are	 the	 states	 aware	 of	 that	 situation	 and	 do	












other	 propaganda,	 which	 strengthen	 state	 (national)	 spirit	 and	 unity.	
For	 instance,	 in	the	case	of	the	Autonomous	Community	of	the	Basque	










“subversive	 influence”	of	 institutions	by	offering	 “opportunity	 structures”	
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come about simply because those institutions have not been allowed to 
be	set	up	in	the	first	place.	Consequently,	in	the	French	Basque	Country	
there	is	no	secessionism,	not	even	a	well	articulated	regionalist	movement	
which could create a critical mass of pressure on the central government 
to establish a single Basque département. Precisely the “absence or 
the fail of devolution processes could partially help to understand why 
some cultural communities in France…have not developed a secessionist 
strategy	 beyond	 some	 marginal	 movements”	 (Balcells	 et	 al.	 2012:	 4),	
because the minorities have no “autonomous political unit under which 
they	can	organize	and	mobilize”	(ibid:	12).	
In	 contrast,	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Spain,	 after	 Franco’s	 death	 in	 1975,	 has	
undergone	 a	 fundamental	 state	 reconstruction	 based	 on	 a	 quasi-
federal	principle.	However,	 it	 intentionally	avoided	mentioning	the	term	
“federation”	 in	 the	 Constitution	 of	 1978,	 exactly	 with	 the	 purpose	 to	
avoid	 giving	 too	much	 importance	 and	 “subversive”	 character	 to	 the	
autonomous	 communities	 (Moreno	 2006:	 4).	 The	 decision	 not	 to	 give	
autonomy	 just	 to	 a	 small	 number	 of	 so-called	 “historical	 nationalities”,	
but	to	give	it	to	all	Spanish	regions	(popularly	called	“café	para	todos”,	
a	“coffee	for	all”	phenomenon)	resulted	in	the	foundation	of	seventeen	
autonomous communities. The decision aimed at diminishing “the 
subversive	influence	that	Catalan	and	Basque	identities	contain”	(Ruggiu	
2012:	16),	that	is,	to	“dilute”	Catalan	and	Basque	nationalism.12 
Finally,	 we	 should	 not	 neglect	 the	 actors,	 elites,	 and	 leaders,	 i.e.	 the	
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incompetent	 and	 uncharismatic	 leader	 will	 not	 be	 capable	 of	 taking	
full advantage of all the opportunities and authority that the existing 
institutions	offer	him/her.
Case study – Spanish and French Basque Country
Introduction
In	this	short	case	study,	a	dual	comparison	of	two	cases,	Spanish	and	French	
Basque	Country,	 and	 the	most	 similar	 systems	 design	will	 be	 used.	 The	
most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common 
features,	and	differ	in	only	one.	For	instance,	French	and	Spanish	Basque	
Country	 are	 situated	 in	 the	 same	 region,	 share	 a	 common	 language	
and	ethnic	 origins;	 they	 are	 both	 part	 of	wider	 nation-states,	 face	 the	
situation	of	diglossia,	etc.	A	differing	feature,	 in	this	case	the	autonomy	
in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque 
Country	–	Euskadi,	is	held	responsible	for	the	different	outcome	(stronger	
peripheral	nationalism	and	secessionism).
The most similar systems design is of course a useful tool and a way to 





the	 famous	 problem	 of	 “Too	 Few	 Cases/Too	 Many	 Variables”	 to	 an	
extreme	(Peters	1998;	Lijphart	1971;	Goggin	1986).13 Although the Spanish 
and	the	French	Basque	Country	can	be	considered	as	most	similar	cases,	





o. 66 - 2012
XXII (76) - 2016
67
In	the	examined	cases,	other	differences	can	be	found	as	well,	like	different	
historical	 paths	 and	 backgrounds.	 For	 instance,	 Franco’s	 dictatorship	
in	 Spain,	and	 its	 harsh	attitude	 towards	 the	Basques	 (see	e.g.	Conversi	
2000a),	is	often	considered	to	be	responsible	for	the	terrorism	of	ETA,	and	
consequently for a stronger Basque nationalism and secessionism in the 
Spanish	Basque	Country.	The	French	Basque	Country,	on	the	other	hand,	
has	 not	 experienced	 dictatorship,	 nor	 stronger	 Basque	 nationalism	 or	
secessionism.  
It is true that Franco’s legacy had a huge impact on Basque society in the 
Spanish	Basque	Country.	It	gave	rise	to	terrorism,	stronger	nationalism,	and	
secessionism.	It	strengthened	Basque	identity,	but	also	had	an	impact	on	
two other features I examine in my paper – institutions and elite building. 
In	other	words,	the	autonomy	gained	in	Spain	is	also	a	result	of	Franco’s	
legacy.	The	results	of	the	accumulated	grievances	during	Franco’s	era;	
the	 tensions,	mass	protests,	and	 terrorist	attacks	not	only	 in	 the	Spanish	
Basque	Country	but	throughout	Spain,	helped	in	pressuring	Spanish	leaders	
to	compromise	with	regionalists	and	autonomists	(and	secessionists).	That	
compromise	 resulted	 in	 the	 Basque	 Country	 being	 given	 autonomy,	
along with Catalonia and other regions in the new Spanish Estado de 
autonomías	(State	of	Autonomies).	
In	France,	in	contrast,	there	was	no	dictatorship.	Therefore,	no	grievances	
were present that were so strong such as to lead to terrorism or mass 
protests to put pressure on the state to gain autonomy. The grievances 
of	 the	 French	 Basques,	 which	 were	 much	 weaker,	 had	 consequently	
weaker	 results	 –	 instead	 of	 full-fledged	 territorial	 autonomic	 institutions,	
French Basques got various consultative bodies and development 
strategies.	Likewise,	the	importance	of	the	Basque	nationalists	(abertzale)	
in	 the	Spanish	Basque	Country,	which	are	 reflected	 in	 their	prevalence	
within	the	(Spanish)	Basque	Parliament,	could	never	have	been	matched	
by	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 Basque	 nationalists	 on	 the	 French	 side,	 simply	
because in France there had been no resentment from the harsh Franco’s 
dictatorship.	 Therefore,	 the	 grievances,	 and	 consequently	 the	 Basque	
nationalism	and	secessionism,	on	the	French	side	were	much	weaker.
However,	 while	 admitting	 the	 importance	 and	 influence	 of	 Franco’s	
legacy	 on	 the	 actual	 Basque	 nationalism	 and	 institutional	 set-up	
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independent	 variable,	 for	 several	 reasons.	 Namely,	 I	 try	 to	 avoid	 the	
aforementioned	problem	of	“too	many	variables,	too	few	cases”,	which	
necessarily	results	in	some	simplification.	It	is	also because the focus of my 
research is concentrated on the further effects of the new institutional 
set-up	(autonomic	institutions)	in	the	Spanish	Basque	Country	on	Basque	
nationalism	 and	 secessionism,	 in	 comparison	 and	 contrast	 to	 the	
institutional	set-up	of	the	French	Basque	Country	(unitary	state,	absence	




Autonomy	 will	 be	 measured	 by	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 local	 autonomy,	
i.e. existing local institutions as well as their competences. Peripheral 
nationalism	 and	 secessionism	will	 be	measured	 by	 several	 criteria;	 the	
strength	 of	 Basque	 identity;	 the	 “Basque	 direction”	 of	 the	 local	 public	
policies,	notably	with	respect	to	the	language	and	language	education	
policy,	since	the	Basque	language	is	one	of	the	main	core	values	of	Basque	
national	 identity;	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 Basque	 nationalist	 parties	 in	 local	
Parliament/Council	 of	 the	Department;	 elite	building	and	 reproducing;	
and	sovereignist/secessionist	attempts.
The Case Study will follow the three arguments of the theory of subversive 
institutions,	 effects	 on	 institution	 or	 “segment-state”	 building,	 identity	
building and elite building.
Argument 1 – Institution building
In	 Spain,	autonomous	communities,	after	 the	1978	Constitution,	control	
almost	 the	 entire	 state	 administration.	 One	 of	 the	 17	 autonomous	
communities,	Autonomous	Community	of	the	Basque	Country	(Euskadi)	
has	 a	 clearly	 defined	 territory,	 a	 democratically	 elected	 Parliament	
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headed by consejeros,	 counsellors),	 a	 Prime	Minister,	 lehendakari,	with	
some	prerogatives	of	a	President,	including	state	honours	and	a	palace.	His	
office	includes	a	mini	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(Acción Exterior,14 External 
Action),	with	its	delegations	abroad.	Thus,	the	Basque	Government	can	




Country	counts	only	 15,000	employees	 (Muñoz,	 2009).	 Euskadi	disposes	
of its own police force Ertzaintza.	As	mentioned	before,	 several	authors	
argue	that	with	such	a	developed	administrative	apparatus,	a	“segment-
state”,	 in	our	case	 the	Spanish	Autonomous	Community	of	 the	Basque	
Country	(Euskadi),	has	“ready-made	institutions”	of	a	potential	sovereign	
state	 (“proto-state”,	 “state-in-waiting”),	which	diminishes	 the	costs	 of	a	
potential	secession	(Ezgi	2010;	Bunce	1999;	Mansvelt	Beck	2005;	Roeder	
2007,	 2009).	 Finally,	a	democratically	elected	Parliament,	even	without	




institutions have existed. When referring to Pays Basque	 (French	Basque	
Country),	one	actually	refers	to	the	three	historical	“Basque	provinces”	of	
the	Northern	Basque	Country,	which	with	historical	events	became	part	of	
France.	Apart	from	a	certain	cultural	autonomy,15 and some consultative 
institutions	 specifically	 designed	 to	 attenuate	 local	 grievances,16 but 
with	no	executive	or	financial	powers,	the	French	Basque	Country	enjoys	
no	 territorial	 autonomy.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 provinces	 acting	 as	 local	
administrative	units	have	existed	since	the	French	revolution;	the	provinces	
have	been	integrated	into	wider	administrative	units,	departments.	There	
is	 no	 Basque	 department	 in	 France,	 while	 the	 three	 Basque	 provinces	
have	been	integrated	with	another	“completely	French”	province,	Bearn,	
14 More on Acción Exterior’s	web	site:	https://www.euskadi.eus/r48-subaccio/es
15	 For	example,	the	existence	and	the	activities	of	the	Public	Office	of	the	Basque	Language	and	the	Basque	Cultural	
Institute,	presence	of	the	Basque	language	in	schools
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into	the	Département	Pyrénées	Atlantiques.	For	last	couple	of	decades,	
Basque	 nationalists	 in	 France	 have	 claimed	 “a	 Basque	 département”.	
Instead	 of	 a	 département,	 following	 the	 1995	 Loi	 Pasqua,	 the	 Basque	
Country in 1997 got only a status of a pays	 (country,	 shire,	homeland),	
a	quasi-territorial	 structure	with	no	executive	or	financial	powers,	which	






Argument 2 – Identity building
A	new	nation-building	process	can	be	seen	in	the	Spanish	Autonomous	
Community	of	the	Basque	Country	(Euskadi),	where	the	Basque	nationalists	
have	been	 in	power	 for	most	of	 the	post-1978	Constitution	period.17 Its 
institutions	 are	 consequently	 able	 to	 act	 as	 centrifugal	 (“subversive”)	
institutions,	 transmitting	 nationalist	 messages	 through	 the	 media,	 the	
educational	system,	and	regional	institutions.	But	their	nationalist	message	
is	 not	 of	 Spanish,	 but	 of	 peripheral,	 in	 this	 case	 Basque,	 nationalism.	
Streets	are	named	after	 the	 founder	of	Basque	nationalism,	“exclusive”	
Sabino	Arana,	who	advocated	for	an	ethnic	definition	of	“Basqueness”;	
the	Spanish	flag	and	 symbols	of	 Spanish	power	are	absent	 from	public	
places,18	and	in	certain	Basque	textbooks	one	feels	an	antagonism	towards	
everything	 Spanish	 (Mansvelt	 Beck	2005:	 159–160).19	Given	 the	 specific,	
unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia,20 and the importance of 
language	for	national	(and	Basque)	identity,	as	argued	by	many	scholars	
(Anderson	 1990;	 Smith	 2003;	 Hobsbawm	 1993;	 Conversi	 2000a;	 Costa-
17	 More	on	this	in	the	following	section	(Argument	3)
18	 E.g.	 the	 king,	 symbol	 of	 Spanish-Castilian	 domination,	 has	 been	 taken	 out	 from	 the	 traditional	 coat	 of	 arms	 of	
Guipuzcoa,	which	for	that	reason	had	to	be	changed	(Mansvelt	Beck	2005:	159).
19	 	The	content	of	certain	schoolbooks	…	stimulate	hatred	of	all	that	is	Spanish“	(Mansvelt	Beck	2005:	160).
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official	and	educational	 language,	 in	 the	sense	of	Gellner’s	“language	
of	 high	 culture”	 (Apaolaza	 Beraza	 2004).	 (Re)introducing	 the	 Basque	
language	 not	 only	 in	 schools	 and	 universities,	 but	 literally	 everywhere,	
rebasquisating	 Euskadi,	 the	 Basque	 identity	 is	 (re)enforced.	 Nowadays	
almost	all	 institutions	under	 the	control	of	 local,	autonomous	 institutions	
in	the	Spanish	Basque	Country	are	obliged	to	adopt	Action	plans	or	Five-
year plans for language normalization,	that	is,	to	reinforce	the	use	of	the	
Basque language.21	The	Basque	Government	in	that	way	projects	certain	
ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A 
new,	Basque	nation	is	being	built	(Tejerina	1999:	76).	


















developments can be seen everywhere.
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“equally	Basque	and	Spanish”,	3%	“more	Spanish”,	and	3%	“only	Spanish”	
(Euskobarometro,	 Mayo	 2015,	 grafico	 26).	 As	 can	 be	 noticed,	 Basque	
identity	is	most	prevalent,	with	a	significant	percentage	of	people	claiming	
dual identity. The number of people who identify as having Spanish identity 
(more	or	exclusively	Spanish)	is	quite	low.	Opinion	polls	also	testify	to	the	




Spanish Cortes,	 and	 11%	 in	 the	 Spanish	 Government	 (Euskobarometro	
Noviembre	 2014,	 grafico	 14).	 Trust	 in	 the	 Basque	 Prime	Minister	 is	 56%,	
while	in	the	Spanish	Prime	Minister	it	is	only	7%	(ibid,	grafico	22).	Regarding	
the	attitude	 towards	 secessionism,	 35%	of	 the	 interviewees	 support	 the	
present	autonomous	status,	29%	favour	federation	(which	involves	a	more	
autonomy),	 7%	 favour	 more	 centralization,	 and	 25%	 favour	 secession.	
Although	 the	 latter	 figure	 alone	 seems	 low	 as	 a	 proof	 of	 secessionism	
in	the	strict	sense,	the	first	 two	figures	could	be	added	 if	secessionism	 is	





schools,	 society	and	public	 institutions,	 the	Basque	 language	still	does	not	
enjoy	 official	 status.	 The	 improvement	 in	 the	 linguistic	 situation	 owes	 only	
partially	 to	 the	authorities.	However,	 there	 is	an	 immense	difference	 from	
Spain. The French state after the 1980s allowed more freedom and space 
for	 “regional	 languages”	 to	be	 taught,	but	did	 not	 impose	 it,	 force	 it	 via	
“dictate”,	as	was	the	case	in	the	Spanish	Autonomous	Community	of	Euskadi.	





Office	 of	 the	 Basque	 Language	 (OPLB),	 which	 helps	 and	 promotes	 the	
teaching	of	the	Basque	language	in	the	French	Basque	Country,	but	it	has	
no authority to impose Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería 
de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012





French identity and French language in education and in society prevail. 
There	is	no	“Basque	direction”	or	Basque	nation	building	process.
Argument 3 – Elite building
In	 the	 Spanish	 Basque	Country,	 Autonomous	Community	 of	 the	 Basque	
Country	(Euskadi),	there	is	the	local	(Basque)	Parliament,	where	the	Basque	
nationalists	have	dominated	since	the	first	elections	after	the	establishment	
of	autonomy	(in	1980),	with	an	average	of	60%	of	 the	votes/seats	 in	 the	
Basque	Parliament,	except	for	the	period	2009–2012	(due	to	the	ban	of	the	
Basque	radicals	before	the	elections)	(Gobierno	Vasco;	Archivo	resultados	
electorales).	 In	 the	 current	 legislature,	 the	 nationalists	 (moderate	 PNV-
EAJ22 and radical EH Bildu23)	have	48	out	of	75	seats.	That	means	that,	for	
example,	they	have	been	able	to	impose	a	“Basque	direction”,	e.g.	policies	
of rebasquization (language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan (see	
next	section). There are also numerous examples of party competition in 



















Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista	(The	Communist	Party	of	the	Basque	Homelands,	EHAK)	which	were	outlawed	by	
the Spanish Supreme Court or were under threat of being outlawed for their connection or support to ETA.
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In	 the	 French	 Basque	 Country,	 due	 to	 the	 non-existence	 of	 a	 local	
Parliament	 or	 self-rule,	 there	 are	 no	 such	 phenomena.	 There	 have	 for	
decades	been	Basque	nationalist	parties,	and	they	get	up	to	10%	of	the	
vote.	Nowadays,	there	is	also	a	Basque	nationalist	party,	AB	(Abertzaleen 












Basque	 nationalists	 in	 the	 Spanish	 Basque	 Country	 (Autonomous	






the	 infrastructure	 (i.e.	 state	 administration,	 a	 kind	 of	 hardware),	 it	 also	
needs	leaders	(a	software	and	IT	experts).	And	here	they	are!	Not	only	are	
they	in	place,	but	they	are	also	in	power!	Finally,	having	their	own	Basque	
University will help to reproduce new Basque elites.
In	contrast,	the	French	Basque	Country	does	not	possess	almost	any	of	the	
above. The difference produced by autonomy is immense.
24	 As	a	consequence,	e.g.	in	the	Basque	parliament,	statistics	are	being	put	together	about	the	telephone	conversations	
in	 the	Basque	 language,	where	 the	conversations	are	being	 listened	 to,	and	one	of	 the	conclusions	 is	 that	“most	
conversations	are	starting	in	Basque,	and	then	continuing	in	Spanish”.	See	Plan de normalización del uso de euskera 
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Ibarretxe Plan – Peak and limit of autonomy
The	 Government	 of	 Juan	 Jose	 Ibarretxe,	 Euskadi’s	 Prime	 Minister	
(Lehendakari)	from	1999	to	2009,	will	 remain	one	of	the	most	 interesting	
in the few decades of the Spanish Basque Country’s autonomy. His 
controversial 2003 Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community 
of Euskadi,	popularly	known	as	Ibarretxe Plan,	was	actually	a	proposal	for	
a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations 
between	them	would	be	based	on	a	“free	association“	(Art.1).	Without	
going	 into	 the	 details	 of	 the	 proposal,	 suffice	 to	 say	 that,	 had	 it	 been	
enacted,	 even	 without	 a	 completely	 independent	 Basque	 Country,	 it	
would	have	meant	the	end	of	Spain	as	we	know	it	today.




in	 order	 to	 be	 enacted,	 the	 proposal	 needed	 to	 pass	 in	 the	 Spanish	
Parliament.	And	 there,	 it	was	 rejected	without	discussion.	 That	was	not	
surprising.
Today	a	 Spanish	 “carte	blanche”	 for	 an	 independent	 Basque	Country	
seems	completely	unimaginable.	Nevertheless,	remembering	the	“velvet	
divorce”	of	the	Czech	and	Slovak	Republics,	one	cannot	exclude	that,	
with a different set of challenging conditions and leaders in Madrid and 
Euskadi,	bearing	in	mind	as	well	the	development	of	situation	in	Catalonia,	
a	 “new	 Ibarretxe	 Plan”	 that	might	 lead	 to	 a	 “velvet	 divorce”	 and	 an	
independent	Basque	Country,	could	become	a	reality.	
To	 conclude,	 the	 autonomy	 enabled	 institutions	 (Parliament/Argument	
1)	 nurtured	 Basque	 identity	 (Argument	 2),	 enabled	 Basque	 nationalists	
to	come	to	power,	created	a	space	for	Basque	elites	and	leaders,	and	
created the space and even the incentives for party competition in Basque 
nationalism	 (Argument	 3).	 The	 thing	 the	 autonomy	 has	 not	 produced,	
and	that	is	missing	for	secessionists,	is	a	“window	of	opportunity”	(Bunce	
1999).	 But	 if	 the	 “window”	 opens,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of,	 for	 example,	 the	
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Czechoslovak	“velvet	divorce”,	an	opportunity	for	a	potential	sovereign	
Basque state could be created. 
Conclusion




central	 state.	 For	 that	purpose,	a	 short	 case	 study,	a	dual	 comparison	
of	 the	 Spanish	and	 the	 French	Basque	Country,	 has	been	made.	 They	





institutional autonomy. Using the notions and signs of the Boolean algebra,	
autonomy,	 as	 defined	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 article,	 in	 the	 Spanish	






been demonstrated in what way the institutions in the Spanish Basque 
Country	 foster	 or	 could	 foster	 peripheral	 nationalism	and	 secessionism,	
in	 contrast	 to	 the	 French	 Basque	 Country,	 underlining	 the	 differences	
arising	 from	 the	distinct	 institutional	 set-ups.	With	 the	 intention	 to	avoid	
the	 problem	 of	 “too	 many	 variables,	 too	 few	 cases”,	 other	 potential	
explanatory	variables,	like,	e.g.,	Franco’s	legacy	and	dictatorship	versus	
the legacy of democracy in France have been left out.
The	main	 arguments	 of	 our	 hypothesis	 are	 that,	 with	 the	 institutions	 of	
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autonomy,	the	region	gains	the	capacities	of	a	potential	(independent)	
state,	 which	 facilitates	 the	 process	 of	 (proto-)	 state-building	 in	 an	
administrative	and	political	sense,	and	diminishes	the	costs	of	 institution	
building in the event of a potential secession. The local elites and leaders 
are	being	built	–	the	Prime	Minister,	Government	and	Parliament	–	which	
have	 behind	 them	 democratic	 legitimacy,	 institutions,	 and	 financial	
backing.	 Institutions	of	autonomy	 facilitate	collective	action	and	make	






by official nationalism,	whereby	we	encounter	 a	 change	of	 paradigm	
or	 of	 loyalty.	 Instead	of	 loyalty	 to	 the	ex-employer,	 the	 (unitary)	 Spain,	
now	 the	 new	 (local	 “autonomous”)	 civil	 servants	 in	 the	 Autonomous	
Community	are	loyal	to	the	new	“autonomous”	Government.	The	parallel	









While	 in	Euskadi	 the	nationalists	have	 since	1980	 scored	around	60%	of	






and	 an	 intensive	 “Basquization”	 through	 the	 language	 normalization	
policy	 in	Euskadi,	which	has	not	been	 the	case	 in	Pays	Basque.	 Finally,	
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in	the	Pays	Basque	anything	of	a	kind	 is	beyond	the	 imagination.	There	
is	 no	 French	 Basque	Government	 to	 conceive	 such	a	plan,	 no	 French	
Basque Parliament to act as a forum where such a plan could be voted 
on,	and	no	prevalence	of	Basque	nationalists	to	vote	for	such	a	plan.	All	
of these phenomena are the direct or indirect results of the autonomy 
that has been allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the 
Spanish	 Basque	Country.	 Likewise,	 these	 are	 also	missing	 in	 the	 French	
Basque	Country	due	to	the	lack	of	autonomy.
Counter-arguments	 that	defend	 the	 federalism,	 not	only	 for	 reasons	of	
the	limits	set	by	the	scope	of	the	paper,	but	also	because	of	the	strength	
of	 the	 arguments	 themselves,	 have	 not	 been	 quoted.	 They	 are	 strong	
enough	to	be	valued,	because	they	go	deep	into	the	core	of	federalism,	
the institutions of autonomy and their raison d’etre.	That	is,	the	institutions	
of	 autonomy	 exist	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 keeping	 the	 integrity	 of	
the state and a partial accommodation of grievances of the minority 
population. 
Without	denying	the	reason	for	the	existence	of	ethno-federations	(based	
on	 an	 ethno-linguistic	 principle),	 and	 institutions	 of	 autonomy	 as	 such,	
the	hypothesis	put	 forward	 is	 that	 the	restructuring	of	a	state	on	ethno-
federal	principle,	although	at	a	certain	moment	apparently	a	good	or	
even	the	only	viable	solution	–	if	the	alternative	is	the	breakup	of	the	state	
– will not necessarily be a durable solution. It might result in the “paradox 
of	 federalism”	 (Erk	and	Anderson	2009),	 “subversive	 institutions”	 (Bunce	
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